X-ray of Transition Agreements in Haiti and a Critical Reading of the National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections
– Philosopher Since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Haiti has been in a nearly permanent cycle of political transitions, punctuated by the signing of agreements, intended to restore constitutional order, stabilize institutions, and organize credible elections in the country.
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince
· 7 min read · Updated 24 April 2026
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy
Since the fall of the Duvalier regime in 1986, Haiti has been in a nearly permanent cycle of political transitions, punctuated by the signing of agreements, intended to restore constitutional order, stabilize institutions, and organize credible elections in the country. From the Governors Island Agreement (1993), through the Political Consensus of 2004, the El Rancho Agreement of March 14, 2014, the Agreement of February 5, 2016, the Agreement of April 3, 2024, up to the recent National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections of February 22, 2026, the Haitian political class has multiplied normative instruments to exit the institutional impasse. Yet, despite this abundance of texts, political stability remains fragile, governance contested, and the state weakened.
This paradox raises a central question: does the Haitian problem truly lie in the quality of the agreements and legal frameworks adopted, or rather in the capacity and will of political actors to implement them with integrity, competence, and a sense of the general interest? In other words, is the Haitian crisis a crisis of texts or a crisis of people?
Literature on fragile states and public governance suggests that institutional effectiveness depends less on normative proliferation than on the quality of leadership, the robustness of accountability mechanisms, and the existence of political elites capable of resisting clientelist and predatory logics. From this perspective, the analysis of successive agreements signed in Haiti over the past (40) forty years highlights a constant: ambitious formal commitments, but deficient implementation, often undermined by impunity, the capture of public resources, and the absence of credible sanctions. This article thus proposes a dual approach. On the one hand, it provides an analytical x-ray of the main transition agreements concluded since 1986, identifying their objectives, innovations, and structural limits. On the other hand, it offers a critical reading of the 2026 National Pact signed by several political parties and groups, and published in the official gazette « Le Moniteur », arguing that a lasting exit from political instability does not depend solely on the signing of a new agreement or pact, but rather on the emergence of an honest and responsible leadership, an indispensable condition for the restoration of public trust and democratic consolidation in Haiti.
After the departure of President Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, the country embarked on a long sequence of constitutional and institutional transitions, leading to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution which established a formal democratic framework for the country's future. Yet, after the adoption of this new constitution and due to the non-observance of pre-established norms, the country plunged into chronic instability, leading to the Governors Island Agreement in 1993, whose objective was to extricate the country from the crisis after the 1991 coup d'état. Indeed, the Governors Island Agreement (July 3, 1993) committed to the restitution of power to Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the reform of the armed forces, and the creation of a new civilian police force; the agreement also provided for international verification mechanisms. Despite its signing, the agreement suffered from weak effective implementation. This led to the failure of the agreement a few years later. In 2004, the country faced a new crisis. Faced with this situation, political elites reached a « Consensus for a Political Transition » signed to orchestrate a civil-political transition, the holding of elections, and the rehabilitation of state institutions in the country. Once again, the text was already in place; however, its application encountered difficulties under the Boniface – Latortue government. In March 2014, a political agreement known as the « El Rancho Agreement » was established. The objective was to set up an open government capable of inspiring confidence and creating the essential conditions for holding free, fair, and democratic elections. Shortly after, due to the failure of the previous agreement, in February 2016, another political agreement was concluded to organize the end of President Michel Joseph Martelly's presidential term and ensure institutional continuity (Agreement of February 5, 2016). Institutional fragilities and political distrust limited the stabilizing effect of the agreement. Multiple texts and proposals have sought to address the absence of central authority, security, and the organization of elections. These documents have often carried intentions, but were insufficiently followed by concrete actions and controls. Officially presented on February 23, 2026, the « National Pact » aims to be a new political and electoral framework initiative to restore stability and prepare for elections in Haiti. Its launch has generated both signatures and criticism within the political class and civil society. We have noted that successive agreements share common traits : (i) institutional diagnosis on the need for police, justice, and electoral framework reforms; (ii) transition mechanisms provisional governments, electoral calendars, monitoring bodies; (iii) international support notably from the United Nations, regional organizations, and international NGOs. The diagnoses are generally accurate and the recommendations pertinent; however, their sustainable implementation leaves much to be desired. The « good texts » encounter political, socio-economic, and security obstacles that hinder their full implementation.
Literature and expert reports identify the capture of public resources by economic and political elites, the absence of credible accountability, and weak judicial capacity as major causes of Haitian fragility. These phenomena limit the effectiveness of agreements: when political or economic elites benefit from the status quo, they have no interest in applying reforms that would reduce their margins of action, according to analyses by Klitgaard and the OECD report. The state's inability to ensure security and monopolize the legitimate use of force makes the implementation of agreements, especially electoral ones, practically impossible without a serious recomposition of the balance of power. Our observation shows that agreements that do not provide real security solutions are thwarted on the ground. The texts require functional administrations to organize elections, verify electoral lists, manage campaign budgets, etc. However, administrative corruption and weak technical capacities prevent the reliable execution of measures provided in the various agreements. Both academic and institutional studies clearly indicate this. The conclusion drawn from the above elements is that the problem is not primarily the insufficiency of texts or agreements, but the absence of a sufficient pool of honest, integral, and competent public officials, capable of resisting clientelist and mafia pressures, enforcing the law, and being publicly accountable. Agreements can outline a roadmap, but actors with probity are needed to execute it.
The national pact attempts to bring together political actors, civil society, and state bodies around a calendar and measures for stabilization and the organization of elections. It builds on previous experience. If we intend to execute this pact without strong and credible measures, firstly to dismantle corruption networks, secondly to secure public spaces, thirdly to ensure independent justice and the prosecution of high-level crimes. Otherwise, the pact risks remaining an « umpteenth charter without effect on the stated objectives » which might be good on paper, but weak in execution. Historical precedents also illustrate that the absence of a state elite willing to apply sanctions and break impunity renders any agreement ineffective. Indeed, the pact draws criticism regarding its inclusivity and the credibility of its signatories, as some parties and organizations have denounced it. Without broad social legitimacy and independent oversight, its stabilizing potential is limited.
Ultimately, the history of agreements in Haiti shows that texts exist and are often relevant. The repetition of failures is less due to drafting quality than to weak political will to enforce rules, capture by political elites, and the insufficiency of integral public actors and effective control systems. The National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections constitutes, in this sense, both an opportunity and a test of truth for the Fils-Aimé government. Its effectiveness will depend not only on its normative architecture but especially on the moral and professional quality of the actors responsible for applying it in full compliance. Exiting chronic instability requires a break with the practices of capture, clientelism, and institutional irresponsibility that have weakened the state for decades. Haiti's recent history teaches a fundamental lesson in public governance: texts can guide action, but only integral men and women can give them substance. Stability is not decreed; it is built through coherence between norm and ethics, between political promise and institutional responsibility. As long as this coherence is not restored, the transition risks remaining permanent and stability, always deferred.
By Jonathan Meus
Literature on fragile states and public governance suggests that institutional effectiveness depends less on normative proliferation than on the quality of leadership, the robustness of accountability mechanisms, and the existence of political elites capable of resisting clientelist and predatory logics. From this perspective, the analysis of successive agreements signed in Haiti over the past (40) forty years highlights a constant: ambitious formal commitments, but deficient implementation, often undermined by impunity, the capture of public resources, and the absence of credible sanctions. This article thus proposes a dual approach. On the one hand, it provides an analytical x-ray of the main transition agreements concluded since 1986, identifying their objectives, innovations, and structural limits. On the other hand, it offers a critical reading of the 2026 National Pact signed by several political parties and groups, and published in the official gazette « Le Moniteur », arguing that a lasting exit from political instability does not depend solely on the signing of a new agreement or pact, but rather on the emergence of an honest and responsible leadership, an indispensable condition for the restoration of public trust and democratic consolidation in Haiti.
After the departure of President Jean Claude Duvalier in 1986, the country embarked on a long sequence of constitutional and institutional transitions, leading to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution which established a formal democratic framework for the country's future. Yet, after the adoption of this new constitution and due to the non-observance of pre-established norms, the country plunged into chronic instability, leading to the Governors Island Agreement in 1993, whose objective was to extricate the country from the crisis after the 1991 coup d'état. Indeed, the Governors Island Agreement (July 3, 1993) committed to the restitution of power to Jean-Bertrand Aristide, the reform of the armed forces, and the creation of a new civilian police force; the agreement also provided for international verification mechanisms. Despite its signing, the agreement suffered from weak effective implementation. This led to the failure of the agreement a few years later. In 2004, the country faced a new crisis. Faced with this situation, political elites reached a « Consensus for a Political Transition » signed to orchestrate a civil-political transition, the holding of elections, and the rehabilitation of state institutions in the country. Once again, the text was already in place; however, its application encountered difficulties under the Boniface – Latortue government. In March 2014, a political agreement known as the « El Rancho Agreement » was established. The objective was to set up an open government capable of inspiring confidence and creating the essential conditions for holding free, fair, and democratic elections. Shortly after, due to the failure of the previous agreement, in February 2016, another political agreement was concluded to organize the end of President Michel Joseph Martelly's presidential term and ensure institutional continuity (Agreement of February 5, 2016). Institutional fragilities and political distrust limited the stabilizing effect of the agreement. Multiple texts and proposals have sought to address the absence of central authority, security, and the organization of elections. These documents have often carried intentions, but were insufficiently followed by concrete actions and controls. Officially presented on February 23, 2026, the « National Pact » aims to be a new political and electoral framework initiative to restore stability and prepare for elections in Haiti. Its launch has generated both signatures and criticism within the political class and civil society. We have noted that successive agreements share common traits : (i) institutional diagnosis on the need for police, justice, and electoral framework reforms; (ii) transition mechanisms provisional governments, electoral calendars, monitoring bodies; (iii) international support notably from the United Nations, regional organizations, and international NGOs. The diagnoses are generally accurate and the recommendations pertinent; however, their sustainable implementation leaves much to be desired. The « good texts » encounter political, socio-economic, and security obstacles that hinder their full implementation.
Literature and expert reports identify the capture of public resources by economic and political elites, the absence of credible accountability, and weak judicial capacity as major causes of Haitian fragility. These phenomena limit the effectiveness of agreements: when political or economic elites benefit from the status quo, they have no interest in applying reforms that would reduce their margins of action, according to analyses by Klitgaard and the OECD report. The state's inability to ensure security and monopolize the legitimate use of force makes the implementation of agreements, especially electoral ones, practically impossible without a serious recomposition of the balance of power. Our observation shows that agreements that do not provide real security solutions are thwarted on the ground. The texts require functional administrations to organize elections, verify electoral lists, manage campaign budgets, etc. However, administrative corruption and weak technical capacities prevent the reliable execution of measures provided in the various agreements. Both academic and institutional studies clearly indicate this. The conclusion drawn from the above elements is that the problem is not primarily the insufficiency of texts or agreements, but the absence of a sufficient pool of honest, integral, and competent public officials, capable of resisting clientelist and mafia pressures, enforcing the law, and being publicly accountable. Agreements can outline a roadmap, but actors with probity are needed to execute it.
The national pact attempts to bring together political actors, civil society, and state bodies around a calendar and measures for stabilization and the organization of elections. It builds on previous experience. If we intend to execute this pact without strong and credible measures, firstly to dismantle corruption networks, secondly to secure public spaces, thirdly to ensure independent justice and the prosecution of high-level crimes. Otherwise, the pact risks remaining an « umpteenth charter without effect on the stated objectives » which might be good on paper, but weak in execution. Historical precedents also illustrate that the absence of a state elite willing to apply sanctions and break impunity renders any agreement ineffective. Indeed, the pact draws criticism regarding its inclusivity and the credibility of its signatories, as some parties and organizations have denounced it. Without broad social legitimacy and independent oversight, its stabilizing potential is limited.
Ultimately, the history of agreements in Haiti shows that texts exist and are often relevant. The repetition of failures is less due to drafting quality than to weak political will to enforce rules, capture by political elites, and the insufficiency of integral public actors and effective control systems. The National Pact for Stability and the Organization of Elections constitutes, in this sense, both an opportunity and a test of truth for the Fils-Aimé government. Its effectiveness will depend not only on its normative architecture but especially on the moral and professional quality of the actors responsible for applying it in full compliance. Exiting chronic instability requires a break with the practices of capture, clientelism, and institutional irresponsibility that have weakened the state for decades. Haiti's recent history teaches a fundamental lesson in public governance: texts can guide action, but only integral men and women can give them substance. Stability is not decreed; it is built through coherence between norm and ethics, between political promise and institutional responsibility. As long as this coherence is not restored, the transition risks remaining permanent and stability, always deferred.
By Jonathan Meus
