Haiti: The Emergence of an Arms Market at the Heart of the Crisis

For over a decade, Haiti's sociopolitical crisis has undergone a profound transformation. The explosion of street crime has gradually overshadowed another form of criminality historically rooted in the country's public life: white-collar crime1. There was a time when popular mobilizations demanded accountability, the fight against corruption, smuggling, and tax evasion. Today, these demands seem to have been relegated to the background. Faced with rising violence and the expansion of armed gangs, the population's primary demand is now security. The reality on the ground sometimes defies understanding. Armed groups, composed of often marginalized, sometimes uneducated individuals who have never left their immediate environment, have managed to acquire sophisticated military equipment. In some cases, they even appear better equipped than state institutions. This situation has gradually led to a reversal of the power dynamic: gangs are no longer content with controlling certain neighborhoods; they are now able to drive the state out of its own administrative centers. According to United Nations estimates, nearly 80% of the Haitian capital is now under the control of gang groups. In such a context, many believe that the state has no choice but to resort to more coercive means to try and restore order. This view, increasingly dominant in certain sectors of national life, rests on a simple conviction: only an armed response will allow a return to security. But behind this logic lies another reality, rarely discussed: the progressive transformation of the security crisis into a genuine market. Indeed, faced with the rise of gangs, the state has now committed to a war budget3. In this sense, security forces must strengthen their operational capabilities: acquisition of ammunition, kamikaze drones, technological equipment, and armored vehicles. This progressive militarization of the state's response generates new needs, new contracts, and, inevitably, new economic interests.
With our porous borders, the fight against gangs also requires increased control to curb arms trafficking and smuggling. This reality opens the way for public contracts and public-private partnerships for border surveillance, security logistics, or the management of strategic infrastructure. In this dynamic, the prison system appears as another rapidly expanding sector. Furthermore, the state's most significant investment in the context of the crisis involves a fifty-year contract for the construction and operation
1 Paul Eronce Villard, Haiti and the Spectre of Corruption: outline of a moralization of public life, C3 edition
2 https://news.un.org/fr/story/2025/08/1157311
3 https://lenouvelliste.com/article/257329/haiti-un-budget-de-guerre-sans-recrutement-massif-dans-la-pnh-et-les- fadh of penitentiary infrastructure (3 establishments) totaling 6,022,500,000.00 US dollars4. Certainly, some information related to national security must remain confidential. But several fundamental questions deserve to be asked. Where do the army and police procure their equipment? Which companies benefit from these contracts? In the case of acquiring armored vehicles or technological equipment, is there a real transfer of technology capable of strengthening national capacities?
Beyond these questions, a deeper question remains: is the security response sufficient to resolve the Haitian crisis? Further arming law enforcement can be an immediate response to the emergency. But can peace be sustainably built solely with weapons? Shouldn't there also be massive investment in education, vocational training, the development of technical trades, and the promotion of sports and cultural activities? Given the increasing investments dedicated to strengthening the state's repressive apparatus, what institutions have we truly created to prevent youth violence? What prospects are offered to them to divert their energy from criminal networks? For the violence ravaging the country today does not arise in a vacuum. It is rooted in a deep social crisis, marked by exclusion, a lack of economic opportunities, and the progressive erosion of public institutions. For many young people, criminal activities have become not only accessible but sometimes perceived as one of the few means of social advancement. By refusing to address the structural causes of this crisis, the country risks condemning itself to indefinitely treating its consequences. Meanwhile, a genuine security and arms market is developing in the shadow of instability. The question is therefore no longer just how to fight gangs. It is also about understanding who benefits sustainably from the crisis. Otherwise, the fight against insecurity risks transforming into an endless cycle, where the security response itself fuels a market that thrives on the crisis. Josue AUGUSMA, Procedural / Criminal Lawyer 4 FJKL, Liquidation of National Sovereignty via Leonine Contracts: the Fondation Je Klere Cries Scandal, March 2026