Duvalier, in the Shadow of the Cold War

When foreign policy is not merely decorative Published in 2014, Wien Weibert Arthus's Duvalier, in the Shadow of the Cold War immediately discards the binary pro- or anti-Duvalier prism that generally envelops the figure of François Duvalier and makes archives the cornerstone of its analysis. By choosing the angle of foreign policy, the work establishes the debate on the ground of evidence. Embassy dispatches, correspondences, minutes, and memorandums form a body of material that allows one to follow, almost day by day, the place that Haiti occupied, particularly on the inter-American scene, between 1957 and 1963. The book starts from the hypothesis that diplomacy is not a backdrop, but one of the vital organs of the regime, a space where legitimacy, resources, and narratives are constructed. As Arthus writes, « During his constitutional presidency, Duvalier placed his foreign policy entirely at the service of his domestic policy. Everything he undertook aimed at a single objective: to maintain power in a real and effective manner. » The international stage offered François Duvalier a grammar of constraints and opportunities. The Cuban revolution reconfigured fears, the United States' security doctrine permeated the Organization of American States, France adjusted its interests, and the Dominican Republic oscillated between rivalry and utility. In this context, Duvalier spoke the dominant language of the time, that of anti-communism, and converted the attention of Washington and neighboring capitals into tangible support, credits, cooperation programs, technical assistance, and police backing. Foreign policy acted as an instrument of government. The author highlights the personal centralization of this lever: « He is the one who defines and conducts his foreign policy, in complete independence. He keeps his hands free in all matters. » The work documents a continuous personalization of the diplomatic apparatus. Positions yielded benefits, decisions were concentrated at the palace. The leader's word tended to merge with the voice of the State. Protocol incidents transformed into signals of sovereignty, tactical reversals maintained useful uncertainty. This centralization allowed for differentiated approaches without a break in coherence: vigilant alignment with Washington, the principle of non-interference at the Organization of American States, cultural and Francophonie focus in Paris, strategic use of Santo Domingo as a deterrent or a point of support depending on the circumstances. The religious issue illustrates the same logic. The power struggle with a part of the clergy stemmed from a diplomacy of sovereignty aimed at symbolic mediations. The negotiation with Rome was a chapter of foreign policy whose effects permeated the internal scene. The demand for a national clergy served to redraw the balance between spiritual and state authority. Vatican diplomacy functioned here as an extension of state diplomacy. The study follows the circulation of techniques between external and internal spheres. Maintained fear, discreet blackmail, the creation of useful enemies, and the narrative of resistance to interference moved from one theater to another. Promises of aid, lines of credit, training, and cooperation were anchored to a political economy of loyalty and control. The commentary connects the map room to the apparatuses of coercion and shows how the international scene provided means, justifications, and images. Arthus places this mechanism within what he calls « deep forces » structuring public action: « the racial question, the culture of authoritarian power, the struggle between Catholicism and Vodou, the weight of Francophonie, the geographical proximity to the Dominican Republic and the United States. » Partners appeared with their ambivalences. The United States oscillated between defending regional stability and irritation at the methods employed in Port-au-Prince. The Organization of American States proclaimed principles then adapted to the circumstances. France maintained cultural and protocol relations while protecting its interests. This multi-faceted game opened interstices that the Haitian power consistently exploited. The key lay in a nuanced reading of the fears of the era and the fault lines between East and West. The contribution of the work lies in an inversion of perspective. The Haitian state appears as a producer of foreign policy, not merely an object of pressure. Diplomacy did not mask repression; it supported and organized it. The trajectory towards the lifelong presidency is explained by internal coercion and by the art of inhabiting the world map: speaking the language of security, making oneself useful to regional architecture, obtaining resources, and deferring the question of rights. This critical reading is distinguished by its empirical foundation and analytical rigor. Neither an accusatory stance nor a geopolitical excuse, it offers a follow-up of practices, sequences, and effects. It reminds us that foreign policy can structure an internal order when it relies on dominant fears and the ambiguities of an international system preoccupied with hemispheric discipline. Thus, the idea is established that, under Duvalier, diplomacy was not a ceremonial function; it served to govern, punish, finance, narrate, and occupied the role of a ministry of survival with its official and informal relays, its platforms for address, and its targets.