Between Armed Gangs and Institutional Constraints: A True Haitian Electoral Equation

Port-au-Prince, Wednesday, December 24, 2025 — As 2026 approaches, the question of organizing elections in Haiti is directly confronting an increasingly alarming security reality. Public statements from former security officials, political figures, and civil society actors converge on the same observation: generalized insecurity currently constitutes the main obstacle to holding free, credible, and inclusive elections. During his intervention at the Global Forum of the Haitian Diaspora, the former Director General of the Haitian National Police (PNH), Michel-Ange Gédéon, recalled that the current security crisis is not accidental, but rather the result of a progressive and political weakening of sovereign institutions. According to him, the rise of armed gangs, now structured, autonomous, and heavily equipped, has profoundly altered the balance of power. This transformation turns criminal groups into actors capable of imposing exclusion zones, de facto compromising all normal civic activity, including the electoral process. This analysis finds a direct echo in recent events. On Tuesday, December 23, 2025, heavily armed individuals affiliated with the group Viv Ansanm attempted to hijack several boats at sea, in an operation aimed, according to security sources, at strengthening their financing and supply networks. This attempt was thwarted by the Haitian Coast Guard, preventing a serious precedent: the extension of gang control to strategic maritime routes. This episode, however, illustrates the adaptability of armed groups and the persistent vulnerability of land and maritime borders. Concurrently, kidnappings for ransom are experiencing a worrying resurgence, particularly in the Delmas areas, where reported cases are multiplying. These kidnappings, which indiscriminately affect civilians, workers, students, and merchants, contribute to a climate of daily terror. This chronic insecurity hinders the free movement of citizens, limits access to public services, and fuels a generalized retreat, incompatible with any electoral dynamic based on popular participation. On the legal-electoral front, the implications are significant. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP), although responsible for planning and organizing the election, faces objective constraints: inability to deploy its agents in certain areas, difficulty in securing registration centers and polling stations, and a lack of sufficient guarantees for the protection of voters, electoral material, and personnel. In several neighborhoods of the metropolitan area, state authority remains contested, or even nonexistent, raising the fundamental question of territorial equality in voting. Adding to these obstacles is the fear of severely compromised electoral participation. The fear of displacement, the informal closure of entire neighborhoods, and pressure exerted by armed groups risk de facto excluding a significant portion of the electorate. In such a context, even a technically organized election could suffer from a legitimacy deficit if a significant segment of the population is prevented, directly or indirectly, from exercising its right to vote. The statements by one of the members of the transitional presidential council, Dr. Frinel Joseph, hailing the publication of the electoral calendar as a step towards restoring constitutional order, reflect a genuine institutional will. However, as Michel-Ange Gédéon emphasized, no electoral calendar can compensate for the absence of effective security on the ground. International standards for democratic elections require not only a legal framework but also a secure environment guaranteeing freedom of choice, absence of coercion, and protection of voters. Warnings from figures like Jacky Lumarque and Sterline Civile reinforce this diagnosis. They recall that the fight against gangs, if not accompanied by a sustainable strengthening of judicial, police, and electoral institutions, risks producing limited effects. Persistent impunity, the politicization of violence, and the instrumental use of armed groups have contributed to weakening the state, making any democratic transition particularly vulnerable. Thus, on the eve of 2026, the question is no longer just whether elections can be organized, but under what conditions they could be held without reproducing patterns of exclusion, fear, and contestation. As long as attacks against civilians continue, kidnappings increase, and gangs maintain a high operational capacity, the electoral process remains exposed to major risks, both in terms of security and its democratic credibility.