Electoral Process in Haiti: The CEP's Machine Operates Amidst Deepening Security Quagmire
Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé gathered his government at Villa d’Accueil this Saturday, March 7, 2026, to “chart the roadmap” towards credible elections, and the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) extended the recruitment of electoral agents until March 11, an existential question runs through the
By La Rédaction · Port-au-Prince
· 6 min read · Updated 24 April 2026
Translated from French — AI-assisted and reviewed by the editorial team. The French version is authoritative. Read the original · About our translation policy

While Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé gathered his government at Villa d’Accueil this Saturday, March 7, 2026, to “chart the roadmap” towards credible elections, and the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) extended the recruitment of electoral agents until March 11, an existential question runs through the political class: how to organize an election when 60% of the electorate lives in lawless zones and parties have lost even their headquarters?
Outwardly, everything seems to be working. On one hand, the Prime Minister's Office publishes a solemn statement where the Head of Government outlines his “strategic vision” and sets “precise guidelines” for his ministers, particularly regarding “the preparation of elections, in accordance with the legal framework and the National Pact.” On the other hand, the CEP announces a technical extension of the recruitment of electoral registry agents and notes with satisfaction that “about fifty” parties have already begun their registration.
But behind this façade of administrative normality, an analysis of the statements by Mr. Rosemond Pradel, Secretary-General of the FUSION of Haitian Social Democrats party and former occupant of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport and Communications (MTPTC), reveals a systemic collapse that official statements seem to carefully avoid.
The Security Axiom: The Variable Calendars Ignore
The Prime Minister's Office statement lists three national priorities:
“the restoration of security throughout the territory, the economic and social recovery of the country, and the organization of free elections.”
The wording suggests a simultaneity, or even a synergy, between these objectives.
However, on-the-ground analysis dictates a rigorous sequential order that political discourse refuses to acknowledge. Mr. Rosemond Pradel is categorical:
“The current security environment does not allow us to organize elections.” This is not merely an observation of insecurity, but an undeniable geographical equation. “The departments of Centre, Artibonite, and Ouest alone represent 60% of the Haitian electorate.”
The reasoning is irrefutable: either the CEP organizes elections de facto excluding 60% of voters, which would strip the ballot of all democratic legitimacy. Or it waits for these areas to be secured, which, according to the Secretary-General of the Fusion of Haitian Social Democrats party, pushes the deadline well beyond 2026.
“We are nine months away from the end of 2026, and the gang suppression forces announced by the authorities are still not in place.”
The Prime Minister speaks of “redefining the normative frameworks of security.” But between the norm and its materialization on the ground, gangs continue to administer their territories.



