Without Iran, China in Trouble Jean Venel Casséus

In strategic reflections on the projection of power dynamics in the world, China's project leading up to the 2049 horizon is often presented as a straight trajectory where everything would proceed smoothly: industrial modernization, technological autonomy, and geopolitical affirmation. This discourse, repeated in official statements and many international analyses, conceals, in my opinion, the reality of China's energy fragility, particularly its dependence on partners under significant strategic pressure from countries like the United States: Iran first and foremost.

China is, above all, a major oil importer, despite its efforts to diversify its energy sources (hydro, wind, nuclear…). Its production apparatus, transport system, urban expansion, and internal market stability rely on a regular supply of oil from abroad. In this logic, Iran is a key element in China's energy security. Data from maritime traffic monitoring and oil market analysis show that Iranian crude oil represents a significant portion of China's imports. Several reliable estimates place this share between 13% and 20% of all seaborne oil imported by China. Its oil from Venezuela does not exceed approximately 4%. This difference is not minor: it organizes China's entire energy balance.

This disparity allows us to understand the real hierarchy of dependencies. Venezuela, although often presented in political discourse as an ideological ally, has limited weight in China's energy security. Conversely, Iran is a supplier that, if destabilized or eliminated, could provoke direct effects on refineries, logistics chains, and the country's internal economic stability.

In this context, Iran's situation becomes even more sensitive. Iran is not only a major oil supplier; it is a central point in China's diplomatic and energy architecture in the Middle East. A very large portion of Iran's oil exported today goes directly to China, sometimes estimated up to approximately 90% of total volumes. This creates a strong interdependence, even if it is not symmetrical. Iran depends on China to sell its oil, which is under Western sanctions, while China depends on Iran to secure a significant fraction of its supply at competitive prices.

It is precisely this interdependence that explains China's stance towards US attempts to destabilize Iran. For Beijing, allowing Washington to weaken the Iranian regime, provoke internal disorder, or encourage an uncontrolled change of power would be equivalent to accepting a direct risk to its own energy security. Here, there is no question of ideology or political solidarity; it is a functional calculation. Iran's stability, regardless of the nature of the regime in power, directly falls within the logic of the continuity of China's long-term strategic project.

This does not mean that China is ready to enter into open confrontation with the United States to defend Iran. Chinese pragmatism sets clear limits. Beijing criticizes unilateral sanctions in discourse, uses circumvention mechanisms, but avoids any move that would put its large state-owned companies, its banks, or its access to global financial markets in direct jeopardy. The long-term cooperation agreement China signed with Iran translates a convergence of interests, not an unconditional alliance.