BRICS: Strategic Illusion or Opportunity for the Global South?

In response to Jean Venel Casseus's recently published text, "Without a collective security agreement, BRICS is a farce, not a force," I offer a nuanced reading of the BRICS' actual role in the contemporary international order. While the author's critique is based on solid theoretical foundations derived from classical international relations, it tends to judge BRICS against an alliance model they have never claimed. Calling BRICS a "farce" on the grounds that they lack a collective security agreement is an appealing but incomplete critique. It rests on a classical conception of international power, according to which economy and defense are inseparable. Historically, this interpretation is well-founded: great powers have always articulated prosperity, security, and strategic projection, to quote Waltz. It is also true that BRICS do not constitute a military alliance. They have no mutual defense clause, no integrated command, and no common security doctrine, as highlighted. In the event of a major geopolitical crisis, each state would act according to its own interests. On this point, the critique is legitimate. But to conclude from this reality that BRICS would be politically insignificant or economically illusory amounts to imposing a model on them (that of the Western alliance) which is neither theirs nor necessarily relevant in today's multipolar world. BRICS do not seek to reproduce NATO, if that is the reference, but to rebalance a global economic order long dominated by a single center of power (Stuenkel, 2015). Economically, the facts are eloquent. BRICS countries today represent over 40% of the world's population and approximately 31% of global GDP in purchasing power parity, compared to about 30% for the G7 (World Bank, 2023). This critical mass does not overturn the existing order, but it alters the balance of power. The impact is particularly evident in the diversification of financial channels. The New Development Bank (NDB) is expanding and has already approved over $30 billion in infrastructure and development projects, often without the political conditionalities associated with Bretton Woods institutions. Furthermore, the increase in local currency exchanges aims to reduce dependence on the dollar, a central weapon of American power via financial sanctions (Tooze, 2022). For the Global South (and for countries like Haiti, historically trapped in asymmetric economic and diplomatic dependence), this evolution is not marginal. It opens up room for negotiation, multiplies potential partners, and limits vulnerability to a single system of constraints. It is not an ideological choice to be made, but a calculation of economic survival and relative sovereignty. As for American hegemony, I must admit that it is neither collapsed nor seriously threatened in the short term. The United States retains decisive military, technological, and financial superiority. And with the return of the Ministry of War, this hegemony can only assert itself further. However, their power is becoming less exclusive. BRICS participate in a “dynamic of progressive erosion of unilateralism, not through direct confrontation, but through circumvention and diversification.” And Washington takes them very seriously (eadaily.com, November 3, 2025). The absence of collective security within BRICS remains a real limitation. It prevents the group from becoming an integrated strategic power. But this absence also stems from a choice: that of preserving national sovereignties and avoiding a “frontal confrontation” in an unstable world. BRICS are therefore neither a farce nor a complete alternative to the West. They are a real instrument for reshaping the global economic game. For the Global South, the question is not whether they replace the existing order, but whether they help loosen the grip of a system long conceived without it. And too often against it. Unfortunately for Haiti, the debate on #BRICS arises in a particular context: that of a country de facto under strong political, financial, and security tutelage from the United States. Under these conditions, any diversification of partnerships remains tightly constrained, but the mere existence of alternative economic poles ultimately provides a negotiation lever. Even limited, this margin can matter in a world where unipolarity is receding and sovereignty is being rebuilt in stages. Herold Israel, MBA
San Juan, PR